When the red harvester ant is threatened, nestmates rush to its assistance. The message is a chemical one. Distress is communicated and help summoned by the potential victim ejecting a tiny cocktail of alkanes and terpenoids. Professor E 0 Wilson, who made this discovery, is a distinguished zoologist whose writings have twice been awarded Pulitzer Prizes. His interests extend far beyond entomology, however. Why should human communication be qualitatively different from that of the ant, in being achieved by definable, physicochemical processes? And, if this is the case, surely the same must be true of other social phenomena? Having conceded so much, on what grounds can we exclude other products of human activity such as the social sciences, arts, humanities and ethics? In a mechanistic universe, the whole of human civilization is the ultimate product of the interaction between genes and environment, incredibly complex, as Wilson admits, but susceptible to fundamentally the same analytic techniques as communication in the harvester ant. Consilience (literally, a 'jumping together') is the notion that a common groundwork of explanation applies not only to the sciences but also to the arts, ethics and religion. In his book Consiliencel Wilson applies a combination of broad learning and a style of baroque exuberance to put the case for such a unity of knowledge.
Wilson is thus, as he makes clear, a child of the Enlightenment, paying homage to Bacon and Newton but most of all to Condorcet, who trod the same intellectual path (and who came to grief in the Revolution for reasons probably not unrelated to his philosophy). He mourns the triumph at the end of the eighteenth century of revelatory religion fearful of the outcomes of science, and most of all of Romanticism although regrettably overlooking the most powerful (if not influential) voice of all, that of 'mad' William Blake. As a result of this conflict there was, in Wilson's view, a harmful fragmentation of learning between the 'hard' sciences and the social sciences and humanities. We now have an opportunity, he argues, for a consilience which recognizes the basic unity of knowledge.
It is in many ways an attractive hypothesis, not least to the biological scientist, whose status and influence would be mightily extended if it were widely accepted. It is worthy of debate not least because Wilson is one of the leading scientific thinkers of our day. In my view it is also profoundly misguided. There are indeed two separate issues which are conflated throughout the work. They have been well rehearsed in the long history of the philosophy of science. The first derives from the belief in mechanism i.e. that all natural phenomena including products of the human mind belong to the material universe. The second is represented by the reductionist position and is dependent upon the truth of the first but does not necessarily follow from it. According to this view, the behaviour of complex systems such as the human mind and human society is no more than the sum of the activities of its constituent biological processes, which are in turn the outcome of the basic laws of physics and chemistry. Identifying these fundamental laws and processes will therefore allow the definition and prediction of these phenomena.
The forces of traditional vitalism have been in retreat for more than a century. Where biological mechanisms have been sought for physiological processes in man, they have been defined with varying degrees of incompleteness, but there has been no suggestion that the laws of chemistry and physics do not apply. The hypothesis that there are gaps in the causal sequence which ultimately gives rise to, for instance, the products of mental activity and which require supernatural intervention is a deeply unfashionable one. The Cartesian ghost in the human machine would seem to have been exorcised. This is perhaps particularly the case for clinicians, who are only too familiar with the devastating effects of mechanical damage upon the higher, quintessentially human, forms of mental activity and personality.
All this should not imply automatic acceptance of a reductionist approach in explaining the phenomena of the human mind and society. The triumph of mechanism is a qualified one. For one thing, there is the curious asymmetry of scientific success which Wilson himself notes. The contribution of individual mechanisms to holistic processes has proceeded apace by reductionist analysis. Receptor interactions, signal transduction and DNA transcription and translation can be specified in molecular detail. On the other hand, even at the cellular level it has not been possible to reintegrate these systems into persuasive predictive models except in the most simplistic way. At the tissue, organ or whole animal level, the magnitude of the problem of prediction from individual molecular processes is mindboggling: the analytic approach is more successful than the synthetic. This is parallelled by study of the physical world, which in the level of its complexity extends well beyond the world in which biologists operate. The molecules which lie at the basis of biological phenomena are massive compared with subatomic particles. This level of the universe is characterized by fundamental uncertainty: concepts such as mass and time lose their meaning. At the other end of the structural hierarchy are complex systems described by chaos theory which are in a state of structured randomness and intrinsically unpredictable: these comprise most of the physical world which we experience. Less complex biological phenomena, which are the focus of scientific 0 0 investigation, lie somewhere in the middle, sharing with the clock and the internal combustion engine a degree of predictability in their operations. Perhaps it is for this reason that the advocates of consilience in its various forms over the years have been biologists rather than mathematicians or fundamental physicists. The basic difficulty is that the world we inhabit comprises levels of complexity and organization with their own methods of understanding and autonomous languages. Investigation of the relationships between them is of limited value. The book in front of me is a material entity subject to the laws of physics and chemistry. I could, if sufficiently misguided, analyse the fibres of the paper and the printer's ink. I could eliminate the reasoning in its pages by selective destruction. Paper technology might enable me to reassemble the fragments and restore some of the meaning. If so, that would be a necessary precondition to my understanding of the work, not an integral component of it. There is an irreducible intellectual content to a book which is not adequately described by molecular analysis of its construction. The same arguments could be applied to a damaged work of art or a mind obtunded by drugs. A description and analysis in the language appropriate to that level of organization is no more and no less real and has just as much predictive validity as a physicochemical description.
This may explain one other striking feature of Wilson's book. The argument for the reductionist approach becomes progressively less convincing as he moves from isolated physiological phenomena (such as the ant's chemical communication system) to the more complex activities of human society. The argument, to my mind, becomes totally unconvincing in the chapter on ethics as the product of brain activity and evolution. In a simplistic sense this is undeniable. Injure the brain (or were it possible, change the evolutionary history which moulded its activity) and its behaviour would change. Indeed, Wilson pursues a familiar path when he discusses the putative evolutionary advantages of the incest taboo or individual altruism, although it is surprising that he ignores Herbert Spencer's writings on, for instance, the evolution of ethical behaviour. Most scientists would opt for evolution rather than divine intervention, but that is not the issue. This does not avoid the naturalistic fallacy of deriving an 'ought' from an 'is' as is claimed; it simply describes the history of the 'is'. The uncertain traveller may be helped by knowing how he reached his position, and even more by knowing where the paths in front of him are leading. He still has to decide which destination he prefers before he proceeds. Evolutionary pressures, however well defined by science, may generate the sort of individual and social behaviour with which most of us would be uncomfortable. I am reminded of two scientific philosophers whose perspective is radically different but much more congenial to me. Neither espoused a conventionally religious view of the universe. Karl Popper, in his Poverty of Historicism, demonstrates the implausibility of 'scientific' theories which claimed to predict historical change. He points out that social change is distinguished from a laboratory experiment by overwhelming complexity, influence of external events from which isolation is impossible and the intrinsically unpredictable effect of new knowledge. Joseph Needham's qualifications as a biochemist and historian of Chinese civilization are somewhat different but his views are similar. In Time, the Refreshing River he discusses the mechanistic philosophy which is 'applicable everywhere, but final nowhere' and expresses his profound scepticism about 'the right of any one of the forms of experience to have the last word about the world in which we live'. To at least one reader of the present book, the use of an unfamiliar term for an extreme form of reductionism does not endow the underlying argument with greater credibility.
